Fuzzy authentication allows authentication based on the fuzzy matching of two objects, for example based on the similarity of two strings in the Hamming metric, or on the similiarity of two sets in the set difference metric. Aim of this paper is to show other models and algorithms of secure fuzzy authentication, which can be performed using the rank metric. A few schemes are presented which can then be applied in different scenarios and applications.
Introduction
Recent years have seen a lot of research around the problem of authentication using approximate matching under a certain metric of similarity, while still enabling a secure storage of sensible authentication data. The typical, but not the only scenario, where such a system is needed, is in the use of biometric features, like fingerprints, for authentication purposes.
Several models have been proposed that may be more appropriate for different applications. For example the fuzzy commitment scheme [8] models data as bit strings and compares strings in the Hamming metric; the fuzzy vault [7] models data as sets of elements and compares sets in the set difference metric.
In this paper we present fuzzy authentication schemes using the rank metric by generalizing the schemes mentioned above for other model scenarios and highlighting possible applications. The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 recalls some mathematical concepts and definitions concerning rank metric codes and linearized polynomials. Section 3 presents the fuzzy commitment scheme in the rank distance, a model whereby the tolerance needed in the authentication is not based on the number of different bits between two strings but on the similarity of two matrices, more precisely on the rank of their difference. Section 4 is devoted to a fuzzy vault scheme using linearized polynomials, which relates the set difference with the rank metric. The scheme is an alternative to the standard fuzzy vault based on Reed-Solomon decoding. Section 5 gives hints on possible applications and model scenarios of the schemes presented in the previous sections.
Rank Metric Codes and Linearized Polynomials
Let q be a prime power and let F q denote the finite field with q elements. Recall that F q m is isomorphic (as a vector space over F q ) to the vector space F m q . One then easily obtains the isomorphic description of matrices over the base field F q as vectors over the extension field, i.e.
In the same way it is possible to define the rank distance between two elements x, y ∈ F n q m as the rank of the difference of the respective matrix representations in F m×n q .
A rank metric code C is a subset of F m×n q (or F n q m ) equipped with the rank distance. The minimum distance of a rank metric code C is the quantity
We can define special classes of rank metric codes introducing linearity. An F q mlinear rank metric code of dimension k is a rank metric code that is also a kdimensional subspace of the F q m -vector space F n q m . An F q -linear rank metric code of dimension k ′ is a rank metric code that is also a k ′ -dimensional subspace of the
Observe that an F q m -linear rank metric code of dimension k is also an F q -linear code of dimension mk.
We will use the notation [n,
Theorem 1 (Singleton-like Bound). Let C ⊆ F m×n q be a rank metric code. Then
Proof. See [5] When n ≤ m a class of codes attaining the Singleton-like bound was first proposed in [5] and then generalized in [9] . These codes are F q m -linear rank metric codes. Let (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ F n q m be a vector, we denote the k × n s-Moore matrix by
. . , g n ∈ F q m be linearly independent over F q and let s be coprime to m. We define a generalized Gabidulin code C ⊆ F n q m of dimension k as the linear block code with generator matrix M s,k (g 1 , . . . , g n ). Using the isomorphic matrix representation we can interpret C as a matrix code in F m×n q . These codes are optimum for rank distance, since they are [n, k, n − k + 1]-codes. Moreover, for this class of codes there exist polynomial-time decoding algorithms decoding up to their error-correcting capability t = n−k 2
, [10, 13, 17] . Observe that when s = 1, this definition of Gabidulin codes is the q-analog of Reed-Solomon codes with the Hamming distance. Here, a set of distinct elements is replaced by a set of linearly independent elements, and the power g i . Reed-Solomon codes can also be seen as evaluation of polynomials of degree less than k in n distinct points. We can give a q-analog of this interpretation for Gabidulin codes, as evaluation of linearized polynomials in n linearly independent elements.
We denote by L m (F q m ) the space of linearized polynomials over F q m .
. . , g n ∈ F q m be linearly independent over F q and let s be an integer coprime to m. Let moreover C be the Generalized Gabidulin code whose generator matrix is M s,k (g 1 , . . . , g n ). Then
From now on we will write G k,s (g 1 , . . . , g n ) for such a code. For many years Gabidulin codes have been the only known MRD codes over F q m . Recently some construction of non-Gabidulin MRD codes have been discovered [2, 3] , but many of these codes are not linear over F q m . Some constructions of linear non-Gabidulin MRD codes can be found in [6] and as a special class of the codes presented in [16] .
Although there are few known constructions of MRD codes, it was shown in [12] that most linear rank metric codes are MRD and that the Gabidulin codes are only a small franction among the MRD codes. the scheme, called fuzzy syndrome hashing, featuring some advantages in terms of security and use of iterative decoding. In [4] they presented scenarios involving burst error correction and higher dimensional data.
Here we are going to describe a new fuzzy commitment scheme using the rank metric. In a following section about applications, we will describe a few scenarios where this scheme can be applied.
In our authentication model, we wish to consider two vectors b, b ′ ∈ F n q m (or, equivalently, their matrix representations B, B ′ ∈ F m×n q ) as belonging to the same person or entity as long as their rank distance is less than a certain predetermined threshold. And for security concerns we do not want to store vectors (or matrices) unencrypted.
Suppose now that we have a rank metric code C ⊆ F n q m whose minimum distance is d = 2t + 1 and assume there exists an efficient algorithm for decoding up to t errors.
Let h : F 
As in the standard fuzzy commitment scheme, we select at random a codeword c b ∈ C and we store the tuple
This scheme is essentially the analogue of the standard fuzzy commitment with the difference that we use rank metric codes instead of Hamming codes. Analogously as in [15] one can show the following result. 
A Linearized Polynomial Fuzzy Vault Scheme
The polynomial fuzzy vault (PFV) scheme was introduced in [7] and allows fuzzy authentication in the set-difference metric. In [11] the authors proposed a fuzzy vault scheme using codes in another metric, relating the set difference with the subspace distance on the set of Grassmanians. The PFV scheme can also be generalized in a natural way using linearized polynomials and codes over the rank metric as follows.
First, we make the following assumption about the set of features used for authentication, both the set initially used to build the vault and the one submitted later for authentication. Assumption 1. Assume that the set of features (A or W in the following) is given by n F q -linearly independent elements in F q n , i.e. it is an F q -basis for F q n . This is usually not a restrictive assumption given the follwing result: Lemma 1. If the features are chosen with uniform distribution, then Assumption 1 is satisfied with probability
Proof. The number of F q -basis of F q n is
, while the number of subsets of F q n with cardinality n is q n n . Now, let ℓ < n be two positive integers and let 0 < s < n be another integer coprime with n. Let (k 0 , . . . , k ℓ−1 ) ∈ F ℓ q n the secret key and
be the corresponding linearized polynomial. Consider a set of features A = {g 1 , . . . , g n } ⊆ F q n given by n F q -linearly independent elements. Choose a random map λ :
Following the classical PFV scheme, we define the sets
P auth is called set of authentic points, P chaf f is the set of chaff points, and V is called set of vault points. The last ingredients of the fuzzy vault scheme are the code
and an error correction decoding algorithm for C. For our constructions of the Linearized Polynomial Fuzzy Vault (LPFV), it is convenient to consider a Gabidulin code as a code whose codewords consist of evaluations of a linearized polynomial f ∈ G ℓ,s over any set of n linearly independent elements in F q n . Concretely, we think of a codeword as a set of pairs {(g i , y i )} n i=1 , where g i ∈ F q n , are linearly independent over F q , and y i = f (g i ), for a linearized polynomial f ∈ G ℓ,s . In this framework, suppose that a witness attempts to gain access to the key, and submits a set of features W ⊂ F q n .
Given Assumption 1, if Z ⊆ V is the subset of vault points (x, y) with x ∈ W , we can consider the F q -linear map
such that L Z (x) = y for all (x, y) ∈ Z. Now, think of the received word c ′ as consisting of the set of pairs {(g i , L Z (g i ))} n i=1 , for g i ∈ A. The secret codeword of the LPFV scheme is instead c, given by the set of pairs {(g i , κ(g i ))} n i=1 . With this notation it is easy to see that
The following results relate the rank distance with the set difference, showing that the rank metric can be a good approximation of the set-difference metric. Let d ∆ (A, W ) := |(A\W ) ∪ (W \A)| denote the set-difference between A and W . Proposition 2. In the setting of the LPFV scheme, suppose that the values λ(x), for x ∈ B are chosen at random uniformly and independently in F q n {κ(x)}. Then
2. Let 0 ≤ u ≤ n be an integer. Then
Proof.
1. Let W be the set of features submitted, and let u = |A ∩ W |. Then
The set of first coordinates of Z is an F q -basis of F q n and the linear map κ − L Z is 0 on A ∩ W . Therefore
2. Since the λ(x), for x ∈ B, are chosen at random uniformly and independently in F q n {κ(x)}, then the values (L Z − κ)(x), for x ∈ W (A ∩ W ) are chosen at random uniformly and independently in F q n {0}. Furthermore, the condition 2d R (c, c
Theorem 3.
Under the same hypothesis of Proposition 2, the following statements hold.
If
, then the vault recovers the key κ(x).
2.
Pr {2d R (c, c
By Proposition 2 we have 2d
. Therefore we are within the error-correction capability and we can correctly obtain the codeword c, and hence the key κ(x).
We can write Pr
Remark. Probabilistic results in Proposition 2 and Theorem 3 do not depend on the probability distribution of the choice of the features. We are only assuming that our construction of the Linearized Polynomial Fuzzy Vault is made by choosing at random uniformly and independently the values λ(x) for x ∈ B.
Generalization of the LPFV Scheme
In our construction of the LPFV we considered Gabidulin codes of length n over F q n . The motivation is that given a set of features W satisfying Assumption 1, the map L Z : F q n → F q n is uniquely determined, and hence also the received word c ′ . We can generalize our LPFV considering Gabidulin codes of length n over the field F q m , where n < m, but we need to define the map L Z in a suitable way.
Before explaining how to construct L Z , we can observe that an analogue of Lemma 1 holds and it can be proved in the same way, but in this case the probability that the set of features is made of linearly independent elements is equal to
Now, let W and A be the F q -subspaces of F q m spanned respectively by W and A. First, we can observe that, in order to build the received word c ′ as the set
, we only need to define map L Z on A. We propose the following construction.
We first define the application L Z on W as L Z (x) = y for all (x, y) ∈ Z. Then complete W to a basis B of A + W , by adding the elements g i in increasing order with respect to the indices i.
is a normal basis of F q m as an F q -vector space. In this way, our map is uniquely determined on A + W, and in particular on A. Let again c be the codeword given by the set of pairs {(g i , κ(g i ))} n i=1 . With this notation it is easy to see that
The following results are the analogues of Proposition 2 and Theorem 3, and they relate the rank distance of c and c ′ with the set difference of A and W .
Proposition 3. In the setting of the generalized LPFV scheme, suppose that the values λ(x), for x ∈ B are chosen at random uniformly and independently in F q m {κ(x)}.
Let the subspace distance be
1. Following the construction of the map L Z , we can write the subspace A as the direct sum of A ∩ W and the subspace A, where A = g i | i ∈ I and I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} with |I| = n − dim Fq (A ∩ W). Therefore we can write
By construction {α
i=0 is a normal basis of F q m over F q , and hence we can conclude that
Substituting this equation in (1) we obtain the first two inequalities. For the last inequality we notice that the map (κ − L Z ) |A∩W is 0 on |A ∩ W |, and therefore
Hence we can conclude that
Then we can write
where u i / ∈ A for i = 1, . . . , n − v and w i ∈ A A for i = n − v + 1, . . . , n − u. Therefore 2 rk(κ − L Z ) | A = 2n − 2v, and the condition
By hypothesis the values (L Z − κ)(w i ), for i = n − v + 1, . . . , n − u are chosen at random uniformly and independently in F q m {0}, and we can conclude that the probability we are looking for is equal to
where X is the matrix representation over F q of the vector (α
this concludes the proof.
Theorem 4.
Under the same hypothesis of Proposition 3, the following statements hold.
2.
1. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Theorem 3.1, using Proposition 3.1. 2. In order to simplify the notation we introduce the events
Remark. Suppose one wants to use a generalized LPFV scheme with n genuine features, and suppose moreover that a field F q and an extension field F q m , with m ≥ n, are given. By Theorem 4.2 we can see that the bigger is m the better is the approximation of the set difference with the rank distance. On the other hand, increasing m implies an increase of the computational cost of the operations. Then one can choose the best m based on the application and the particular requirements of the context.
Applications
The schemes presented above can be applied in several scenarios for different purposes. In this section we would like to give just a few examples.
One scenario for the fuzzy commitment scheme in the rank metric is the following. Suppose B is the matrix used to create the stored tuple and imagine it as an image. It may happen for some reason that B gets somehow damaged in a way that a few rows (or columns) are erased or anyway not the same as before. One can then authenticate with the new matrix B ′ as long as not too many rows (or columns) are different. In another situations the matrix B may be slightly changed into B ′ by having all elements increased by a common error, and again the difference between the two matrices is a matrix of low rank, exactly 1 in this case.
Another scenario involves a multi-factor authentication problem. Suppose that in order to perform authentication one needs a large number of conditions fulfilled, namely imagine a matrix with a large number of columns whereby condition number i is fulfilled whenever column number i equals a predetermined vector v i . If you want to allow authentication as long as a certain big enough number of conditions are satisfied, then the fuzzy commitment scheme in the rank metric can be used. Indeed having two matrices A and A ′ that both satisfy a certain condition corresponds to a zero column in the difference A− A ′ which directly affects the rank distance between the two.
Applications for the linearized polynomial fuzzy vault scheme overlap with those of the standard fuzzy vault, i.e. we are considering authentication based on the set difference metric. It may be preferable to use the linearized version and decoding in the rank metric for certain choices and combinations of parameters which are usually dependent on the application. Also, the use of linear maps may be preferred for certain implementations.
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